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PORTER, Circuit Judge. 
Lorenzo Aguirre-Miron pleaded guilty to five child-
pornography crimes. When sentencing Aguirre-Miron, the 
District Court failed to group certain counts as required by the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines. The District Court’s 
failure was a plain error that affected Aguirre-Miron’s 
substantial rights, and, as explained below, we will exercise 
our discretion to cure the plain error. We will therefore vacate 





Aguirre-Miron pleaded guilty to five child-pornography 
offenses: three counts of production, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2251(a), (e); one count of receipt, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252(a)(2), (b)(1); and one count of possession, in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), (b)(2).1 At sentencing, the 
District Court adopted the Sentencing Guidelines calculations 
from the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”). 
The Sentencing Guidelines require grouping of certain 
closely related counts. The PSR grouped Aguirre-Miron’s 
receipt and possession counts. But the PSR did not group 
Aguirre-Miron’s three production counts; nor did it group the 
production counts with the receipt and possession counts. 
Thus, the PSR listed four groups of offenses. 
After grouping the counts, the PSR determined that the 
offense level for the production counts was 38 and the offense 
level for the receipt and possession counts was 40. Relevant 
here, the receipt and possession offense level of 40 included a 
five-level pattern enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(5). 
The District Court applied the pattern enhancement because 
Aguirre-Miron “engaged in a pattern of activity involving the 
sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor” when he produced 
child pornography. U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(5). 
 
1 The conduct prompting Aguirre-Miron’s indictment included 
the production of three video depictions of child pornography 
of the same minor on three different occasions, the knowing 
receipt of one image of child pornography, and the storage of 
thousands of pornographic images depicting children on two 




After calculating Aguirre-Miron’s combined offense 
level under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4 and accounting for other 
enhancements and reductions, the PSR arrived at an offense 
level of 46, which was capped by the Sentencing Guidelines at 
43. See U.S.S.G. ch. 5 pt. A app. n.2. The resulting Guidelines 
sentence was 130 years’ imprisonment—effectively life 
imprisonment.2 The District Court then granted a one-level 
downward variance to offense level 42, which produced a 
Guidelines range of 360 months to life imprisonment. Finally, 
the District Court sentenced Aguirre-Miron to 360 months’ 
imprisonment.3 
 Aguirre-Miron timely appealed. He challenges the 
PSR’s four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4 
because he believes that the production counts should have 
been grouped with his receipt and possession counts under 
U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(c). 
II4 
The only issue on appeal is whether the District Court 
miscalculated the Sentencing Guidelines range by not grouping 
the production counts with the receipt and possession counts 
under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(c). Because Aguirre-Miron did not 
 
2 We adopt the parties’ practice of referring to the top of the 
Guidelines range as life imprisonment. 
3 Aguirre-Miron’s sentence was 360 months’ imprisonment on 
each of his production counts, 240 months’ imprisonment on 
his receipt count, and 240 months’ imprisonment on his 
possession count, each to run concurrently. 
4 The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 18 
U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 




object to the Guidelines range during his sentencing, we review 
his claim for plain error under Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 52(b). United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 
256 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
Under plain-error review, the defendant bears the 
burden of persuasion. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 
734–35 (1993). He must show that there is: (1) an error, (2) 
that is plain, and (3) that the plain error affects his substantial 
rights. See Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 
1904 (2018). If all three conditions are met, we may exercise 
our discretion to correct the forfeited error if it “seriously 
affects the fairness, integrity[,] or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.” Id. at 1905 (citation omitted). 
A 
At Olano prong one, “there must be an error that has not 
been intentionally relinquished or abandoned.” Id. at 1904 
(citation omitted). Because Aguirre-Miron did not 
intentionally relinquish his current challenge, our first task is 
to determine whether the District Court committed an error by 
failing to group counts under § 3D1.2(c). 
A district court’s first step at sentencing is “to calculate 
a defendant’s Guidelines sentence.” United States v. Gunter, 
462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006). When a defendant is 
convicted of more than one count, a district court’s calculation 
involves grouping together “[a]ll counts involving 
substantially the same harm.” U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2. In relevant 
part, counts involve substantially the same harm “[w]hen one 
of the counts embodies conduct that is treated as a specific 
offense characteristic in, or other adjustment to, the guideline 




A pattern enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(5) is 
a specific offense characteristic in child pornography cases. 
See U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b) (“Specific Offense Characteristics” 
heading). So, if a child-pornography defendant’s offense level 
is increased five levels under § 2G2.2(b)(5) because he 
“engaged in a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or 
exploitation of a minor,” then the counts leading to the pattern 
enhancement must be grouped under § 3D1.2(c). 
Here, the offense level of Aguirre-Miron’s receipt and 
possession counts was increased five levels because of a 
pattern enhancement based on the conduct embodied in his 
production counts. If the District Court had properly grouped 
the counts, Aguirre-Miron’s final offense level would have 
been 42, resulting in a Guidelines range of 360 months to life 
imprisonment. Thus, by failing to group Aguirre-Miron’s 
production counts with the receipt and possession counts, the 
District Court erred. 
B 
At Olano prong two, we must determine whether a 
district court’s error was “plain—that is to say, clear or 
obvious.” Rosales-Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at 1904 (citation 
omitted). The error must be clear under current law (either at 
the time of sentencing or on appeal). See Johnson v. United 
States, 520 U.S. 461, 467–68 (1997). The District Court’s error 
was clear or obvious for two reasons. 
First is the plain meaning of the Sentencing Guidelines. 
The Sentencing Guidelines require “[a]ll counts involving 
substantially the same harm” to be grouped. U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2. 
And counts involve substantially the same harm “[w]hen one 




offense characteristic in, or other adjustment to, the guideline 
applicable to another of the counts.” U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(c). The 
conduct embodied by Aguirre-Miron’s production counts was 
a specific offense characteristic leading to a pattern 
enhancement, so the production counts had to be grouped with 
Aguirre-Miron’s receipt and possession counts under U.S.S.G. 
§ 3D1.2(c). Cf. United States v. Stinson, 734 F.3d 180, 187 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (“That error was clear in light of the plain language 
of the relevant Guidelines provision.”). 
Second, our precedent requires grouping in this case. 
When addressing the same Guidelines provision, we explained 
that a district court’s finding that certain exploitative conduct 
constituted a pattern enhancement “require[d] grouping under 
U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(c).” United States v. Ketcham, 80 F.3d 789, 
794 (3d Cir. 1996).5 
The government argues that Ketcham is inapplicable for 
three reasons. First, the government contends that Ketcham is 
irrelevant because it did not involve a production count. But 
the underlying offense does not change the interaction between 
§ 3D1.2(c) and § 2G2.2(b)(5). 
Next, the government argues that Ketcham’s statements 
about grouping are dicta because we held that the district court 
had improperly applied the pattern enhancement that triggered 
the grouping requirement. Ketcham, 80 F.3d at 795. The appeal 
specifically challenged the District Court’s grouping of counts. 
See id. at 790. We reached the pattern-enhancement issue in 
 
5 Although United States v. Ketcham addressed U.S.S.G. 
§ 2G2.2(b)(4), that provision contained the exact language as 
the current § 2G2.2(b)(5). Compare 80 F.3d 789, 793 (3d Cir. 




the alternative only because the District Court properly 
grouped the counts. But even if Ketcham’s statements were 
dicta, the case shows that the plain language of the Sentencing 
Guidelines requires grouping of counts in a case like Aguirre-
Miron’s. 
Lastly, the government asserts that it was not Aguirre-
Miron’s production counts that led to the pattern enhancement, 
but rather it was the conduct underlying those counts. Although 
the PSR could be read as supporting this approach, the 
grouping requirement is not triggered merely by conduct. 
Rather, it is triggered “[w]hen one of the counts embodies 
conduct that is treated as a specific offense characteristic.” 
U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(c) (emphasis added). For this reason, the 
government’s argument fails. 
C 
An error affects a defendant’s substantial rights under 
Olano prong three if the defendant “show[s] a reasonable 
probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the 
proceeding would have been different.” Rosales-Mireles, 138 
S. Ct. at 1904–05 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). Yet, even though the defendant ordinarily carries the 
burden of persuasion, “[w]hen [he] is sentenced under an 
incorrect Guidelines range—whether or not [his] ultimate 
sentence falls within the correct range—the error itself can, and 
most often will, be sufficient” to satisfy the third prong of 
plain-error review. Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. 
Ct. 1338, 1345 (2016).6 “Absent unusual circumstances,” the 
 
6 Based on this precedent, it is irrelevant that the District Court 




defendant need not show more than that he was sentenced 
under a plainly erroneous Guidelines range. Id. at 1347. 
So, in the context of an unpreserved objection to a 
plainly incorrect Guidelines range at sentencing, we presume 
prejudice. The government is then “free to point to parts of the 
record—including relevant statements by the judge—to 
counter any ostensible showing of prejudice the defendant may 
make.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 The government raises two arguments that unusual 
circumstances show that Aguirre-Miron’s substantial rights 
were not affected by the District Court’s plainly erroneous 
Guidelines calculation. 
 First, the government argues that grouping is 
inappropriate because the harms arising from Aguirre-Miron’s 
production counts and receipt and possession counts are 
different. But this argument fails because, under § 3D1.2, 
counts involve “substantially the same harm” if they embody 
conduct that is a specific offense characteristic of another 
count. See U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(c). 
 Second, the government asserts that, had Aguirre-Miron 
raised his grouping objection during sentencing, it “would have 
argued that [§] 3D1.2(c) only required grouping of two of the 
production counts, as only two instances were required to 
support application of the pattern enhancement.” Appellee’s 
Br. 37. But this counterfactual lacks a basis in the record. So 
we will not consider it for the first time on appellate review. 
 





 The government thus fails to point to record evidence to 
overcome the presumption that the District Court’s plain 
sentencing error affected Aguirre-Miron’s substantial rights. 
D 
Having found that the District Court committed a plain 
error that affected Aguirre-Miron’s substantial rights, we must 
decide whether to exercise our discretion to cure the plain 
error. We may exercise our discretion if an error “seriously 
affects the fairness, integrity[,] or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.” Rosales-Mireles, 138 S. Ct. at 1905 (citation 
omitted).  
Here, the District Court sentenced Aguirre-Miron under 
an incorrect sentencing Guidelines range. A citizen might bear 
a “diminished view of the judicial process and its integrity if 
courts refused to correct” this kind of plain error. Id. at 1908. 
And “correcting sentencing errors is far less burdensome than 
a retrial, or other jury proceedings,” and does not demand 
“such a high degree of caution.” United States v. Payano, 930 
F.3d 186, 199 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Rosales-Mireles, 138 S. 
Ct. at 1909) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the 
District Court’s plain error does not upset a jury’s verdict, 
affects only sentencing, and can be fixed on remand without 
taxing the District Court, we will exercise our discretion to cure 
the plain error. 
* * * 
 Because we exercise our discretion to cure the District 
Court’s plain error, we will vacate the District Court’s sentence 
and remand for resentencing. 
